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In this paper we study the impact of a government spending shock on ag-
gregate consumption, building on the GLV (Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles
(2007)) model. We show that the GLV model implies a counterfactual in-
crease in the real wage, the interest rate and the in￿ ation rate. The intro-
duction of sticky wages solves these problems and preserves the main result
of the model, i.e. the positive response of consumption. Moreover, once
we relax the common wage assumption, sticky wages are even essential to
reproduce the positive response of consumption.
JEL Classi￿cation: E32, E62
Keywords: Sticky wages, rule-of-thumb consumers, ￿scal shocks, ￿rm-
speci￿c capital.1 Introduction and motivation
The creation of a huge public de￿cit in the United States and the debate
on the usefulness of strict budgetary rules in the European Union have re-
newed the interest in the e⁄ectiveness of government spending shocks as
a stabilization tool. The emergence of empirical evidence based on Vector
Autoregressions (VAR) (Perotti (2005) among many others)1 should help re-
searchers understand the impact of these shocks and discriminate between
di⁄erent economic models. The response of private consumption to a govern-
ment spending shock has attracted the bulk of the interest in the literature
because Keynesian and neoclassical models forecast opposite dynamics for
this variable. Keynesian models, based on the IS-LM framework, predict a
positive response of consumption, whereas neoclassical models, based on the
RBC framework, imply a negative response (cf. Baxter and King (1993)).
Somewhat surprisingly, the cited empirical evidence tends to favor the Key-
nesian model by ￿nding a positive and signi￿cant response of consumption,
at least in the United States and despite the paper of Perotti (2005), which
points to a decline in the e⁄ectiveness of ￿scal shocks in the last twenty years.
Some authors have tried to reconcile the analytical rigor of the RBC
framework with the empirical evidence by adding additional features to that
model. For instance, the New Keynesian literature introduces monopolistic
1A non-exhaustive list includes: Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Fatas and Mihov (2002),
Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2007), Burnside, Eichenbaum and Fisher (2004) and Mount-
ford and Uhlig (2002).
1competition and sticky prices into the RBC model. However, these ingredi-
ents, which are very useful to study monetary shocks, are not su¢ cient to
obtain plausible dynamics in the case of ￿scal shocks. In fact, a standard New
Keynesian model with a public sector cannot reproduce a positive response
of consumption because the transmission mechanism is based, as in the RBC
literature, on a negative wealth e⁄ect (Linnemann and Shabert (2003)).
One way to obtain a positive response of consumption has been proposed
by Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles (GLV) (2007).2 Following the suggestion
in Mankiw (2000), GLV introduce "rule-of-thumb consumers" (ROT) into
the basic New Keynesian model to explain the excessive dependence of ag-
gregate consumption on current income compared to the predictions of the
￿ permanent income theory￿ . These consumers cannot optimize intertempo-
rally because of borrowing constraints, lack of access to ￿nancial markets or
simply because they are myopic. Each period, they consume their current dis-
posable income and do not save; they coexist with optimizing agents (OPT),
who take consumption decisions according to the ￿ permanent income hy-
pothesis￿ . OPT agents are more sophisticated because they can hold bonds,
2In the literature, three other solutions have been proposed to account for the evidence
on consumption. The ￿rst is to include government spending in the utility function as a
complement of private consumption (see Bouakez and Rebei (2007) for an application in
the RBC framework). The result depends crucially on the calibration of the coe¢ cient of
risk aversion. A second possible solution is to consider productive government spending,
i.e. to introduce government spending in the production function (Linnemann and Shabert
(2005)). However, the result depends on the production elasticity of government spending.
Linnemann (2006) proposes a third way to obtain a positive response of consumption: a
non additively separable utility function in consumption and labor, combined with a small
intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption, guarantees a positive response of
consumption in the baseline RBC model. For a criticism to this approch see Bilbiie (2006).
2rent capital to ￿rms and receive pro￿ts derived from ￿rm ownership. ROT
agents are a very simple device to break Ricardian equivalence: since they
do not optimize intertemporally, it matters for them whether an increase in
government spending is ￿nanced through an increase in taxation or through
a budget de￿cit. In the ￿rst case their current income decreases, whereas in
the second case it is not a⁄ected. Hence, this model enables us to study the
impact of ￿scal shocks that are not budget balanced, i.e. the kind of ￿scal
shocks that are more plausible in reality.
A government spending shock ￿nanced, at least in part, through a budget
de￿cit, a⁄ects the two types of consumers in di⁄erent ways. OPT consumers,
on the one hand, reduce their consumption rationally in the anticipation
that taxes will increase sooner or later. ROT consumers, on the other hand,
can increase consumption if their current income increases. The response of
aggregate consumption is positive as long as the positive response of ROT
consumption is bigger than the negative response of OPT consumption. This
is the case in a model with de￿cit ￿nancing, sticky prices and monopolistic
competition in the labor market (GLV (2007)). In ￿gure 1 we can see how
the introduction of ROT agents changes crucially the responses of these key
variables: the dashed line represents the traditional New Keynesian model
(100% of OPT agents), the solid line is the same model (under the same
calibration) but with 50% of OPT agents and 50% of ROT agents (GLV
(2007)).
However, this result relies on a big increase in the real wage that pushes
3up the current income of ROT consumers. This is not a desirable property
of the model because the large positive response of the real wage is counter-
factual. The evidence on the response of real wages to government spending
shocks favors a very limited response: in Fatas and Mihov (2001) the max-
imum response of the real wage is around 0.4% following a 1% increase in
the government spending/output ratio but the estimate is never signi￿cant.
In their VAR, GLV ￿nd the same quantitative result as Fatas and Mihov,
and the estimate is signi￿cant only three quarters after the shock, whereas
in the theoretical model the predicted increase in the real wage is around
2%. Furthermore, as argued by Bilbiie and Straub (2004), this large reac-
tion of the real wage is not consistent with the ￿ Lucas less famous critique￿ ,
saying that real wages are roughly acyclical. Real wages are procyclical re-
sponding to productivity shocks. If they are also strongly procyclical with
respect to government spending shocks, it seems di¢ cult to reproduce the
aggregate acyclicality observed in the data. Moreover, the GLV model pre-
dicts a big increase in the interest rate and in the in￿ ation rate that are
also counterfactual. The in￿ ation response is not signi￿cant in almost all
the studies cited above whereas the interest rate response is signi￿cant only
in some studies (Perotti (2005) ￿nds a positive and signi￿cant response of
the interest rate only in the period 1980-2001). By construction, the intro-
duction of wage stickiness in the model prevents the counterfactual swings
in these three variables. However, wage rigidity could make it di¢ cult to
con￿rm the increase in consumption because it prevents the large increase
4in current income that pushes up ROT consumption. Thus, intuitively, we
could imagine a tension between wage stickiness and the positive response of
consumption. The goal of this paper is to check this conjecture in the GLV
model augmented with sticky wages and in a more general model where we
allow for heterogeneity in wages.
In the literature, we can ￿nd many arguments to justify the introduction
of sticky wages into our model. Probably the most convincing is found in
Christiano, Eichenbaum, Evans (2005): according to their results, sticky
wages are essential to reproduce plausible dynamics in aggregate variables
responding to a wide variety of economic shocks. They ￿nd strong evidence
in favor of sticky wages and estimate a degree of nominal wage rigidity much
higher than the degree of price rigidity. Sticky wages have been introduced
in a New Keynesian model by Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000). Since
then, sticky wages have become a standard ingredient in this kind of model.
One could imagine that the successful result of GLV relies heavily on
the counterfactual increase in the real wage and that it is not robust to the
introduction of a more realistic modeling of the labor market. However,
the main result of the paper is that this intuition is not correct and that
a model with sticky wages preserves the crowding-in of consumption: the
GLV result is strongly con￿rmed under more restrictive conditions. The
mechanism is the following. As expected, nominal wage rigidity implies that
wage in￿ ation is much lower and thus the reaction of the real wage is also
low (it is almost ￿xed). In fact ROT consumption increases less, following
5current income closely. However, a second e⁄ect is at work. Lower wage
in￿ ation implies a lower impact on marginal cost, less price in￿ ation and a
much lower increase in the interest rate by the monetary authority. This
lower increase in the interest rate crucially a⁄ects OPT consumption and
investment: both decrease less than in the ￿ exible wage case. It turns out
that for realistic calibrations the two e⁄ects have almost the same size and
thus the positive response of consumption is preserved.
The positive response of consumption in a model with sticky wages is
a very robust result. It holds under a higher elasticity of marginal labor
disutility, a lower degree of price stickiness and it does not depend on the
form of the wage rigidity. As an additional robustness check and for the sake
of realism, we modify the capital accumulation process. Having ￿rm-speci￿c
capital, instead of rental rate capital, enables us to lower the degree of price
stickiness in the model because ￿rm-speci￿c capital lowers the marginal cost
response to demand shocks, as shown by Sveen and Weinke (2005). In GLV
(2007) the positive response of consumption relies on four quarters of price
stickiness, which according to Bils and Klenow (2004) and Steinsson and
Nakamura (2007) is a too high value. Introducing ￿rm-speci￿c capital in the
model, we can obtain the positive response of consumption under only two
quarters of price stickiness.
Finally, we relax the common wage assumption in the labor market. In
GLV (2007) all agents earn the same wage and work the same number of
hours, irrespective of their consumption behavior. A plausible alternative
6is a model where ROT and OPT agents are allowed to choose their own
wage optimally and to work a di⁄erent number of hours. Our second im-
portant result is that in a model with ￿ exible wages the positive response
of consumption is not preserved once we depart from the common wage as-
sumption. However, the result is rescued when sticky wages are introduced.
Under sticky wages the impact of wage heterogeneity in the model is strongly
reduced and the dynamics are similar to the model with a common wage.
Thus the main point of our paper is that not only sticky wages and the
positive response of consumption can coexist, but even the former can be a
necessary assumption to obtain the latter.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the
model, in section 3 we show the results of our numerical simulations and we
check the strength of our results under di⁄erent calibrations. In section 4 we
modify the wage rigidity, introducing real wage rigidity as in Blanchard and
Gali (2007), we change the capital accumulation process, using ￿rm-speci￿c
capital instead of rented capital, and ￿nally we improve the labor market
structure, allowing for heterogeneity in wages. In section 5 we conclude.
2 The model
The economy is composed of a continuum of households and a continuum of
￿rms producing intermediate goods that are transformed into a ￿nal good
by a perfectly competitive ￿rm. The central bank ￿xes the nominal interest
7rate following a simple ￿ Taylor rule￿ . The ￿scal authority collects taxes,
buys a fraction of the ￿nal good and issues one-period bonds. Wages are set
by a continuum of unions, whereas hours worked are determined by labor
demand. In the next subsections we analyze the behavior of each agent.
2.1 Households
The model is composed of a continuum of agents indexed on [0;1]: a fraction
[0;￿], the ￿ rule-of-thumb" agents, consume their disposable income each pe-
riod and a fraction (￿;1], the ￿ optimizing￿agents, optimize intertemporally
and behave according to the permanent income hypothesis. OPT agents can
trade a full set of Arrow-Debrew securities in complete ￿nancial markets.
The generic household is indexed by i 2 [0;1].
2.1.1 Optimizing households
A typical optimizing household, indexed by the superscript o, derives utility
from consumption (Co
t) and disutility from hours worked (No
t ); and max-
imizes the sum of expected future utilities discounted at the rate of time

































and the capital accumulation equation
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where Pt is a price index, Io
t is investment, Rt is the gross nominal interest
rate, Bo
t+1 is the quantity of one-period nominal bonds bought at the begin-
ning of the period, T o
t are lump-sum taxes and Ft is a membership fee to the
union. The four sources of income are labor income (WtNo






, bond holdings paying one unit of the consumption index (Bo
t) and
dividends derived from the ownership of monopolistically competitive ￿rms
(Do
t). ￿ is the rate of depreciation, and ￿(:) is an adjustment cost function
satisfying ￿(￿) = ￿, ￿
0 > 0, ￿
0 (￿) = 1 and ￿
00 ￿ 0.













where ’ is a parameter ￿ 0.
The household maximizes over consumption, investment and bond hold-
ings. Its choice is summarized by the following ￿rst-order conditions that we





t+1 ￿ (rt ￿ Et￿t+1) (3)
kt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)kt + ￿it (4)






+ ￿Et [qt+1] (5)
it ￿ kt = ￿qt (6)
where ￿ ￿ ￿1=(￿
00 (￿)￿). Here, (3) is the Euler equation, (4) is the capital
accumulation equation, while (5) and (6) represent the dynamics of Tobin￿ s
q, denoted qt, and its relation to investment, respectively.
The household does not maximize with respect to labor because we as-
sume monopolistic competition in the labor market. The wage is ￿xed by
unions and hours worked are determined by labor demand. We assume that
the wage mark-up is su¢ ciently high to ensure that both types of households
are willing to supply the quantity of labor demanded by ￿rms.
2.1.2 Rule-of-thumb agents
ROT agents, indexed by the superscript r, have the same utility function
as OPT consumers, Ur (Cr
t;Nr





1+’ but they do not choose
consumption intertemporally. They simply consume their disposable income
each period
3The reader can ￿nd a detailed derivation in GLV (2007). Lowercase variables denote







t ￿ Ft (7)
ROT agents di⁄er from OPT agents because they cannot smooth con-
sumption through bond holdings and because they do not receive dividends.
A ￿rst-order log-linear approximation around the steady state with constant
consumption equalized across households gives
c
r








where rwt = wt￿pt, ￿ = WN
PC = 1
￿C￿p (1 ￿ ￿), ￿p represents the mark-up and
￿c = C
Y . Omission of time subscripts indicates steady-state variables. Note
that the union membership fee drops out because the fee is assumed to be
a quadratic function of wage in￿ ation, which is zero in the steady state, cf.
below.
2.1.3 Aggregation
Aggregate consumption is the average of both kinds of consumption weighted
by the percentage of rule-of-thumb consumers (￿) in the economy
ct = ￿c
r
t + (1 ￿ ￿)c
o
t (9)
Similarly, for aggregate hours
11nt = ￿n
r




2.2.1 Final good producer
The ￿nal good Yt is produced by a perfectly competitive ￿rm that combines
intermediate inputs Y d
t (j) into a ￿nal output through a constant returns to











where "p represents the elasticity of substitution among intermediate goods
indexed by j 2 [0;1].
Pro￿t maximization and the assumption of perfect competition imply the









where Pt (j) represents the price of the good produced by ￿rm j. The zero-






122.2.2 Intermediate goods producers
A typical monopolistically competitive ￿rm operates through the following
technology
Yt (j) = Kt (j)
￿ Nt (j)
1￿￿
where Kt (j) is the capital stock owned by ￿rm j and Nt (j) is an aggregator









Nt (j;z) represents the quantity of variety z labor employed by ￿rm j. We
assume that a fraction ￿ of type z workers is composed of ROT consumers and
the rest of OPT consumers. The ￿rm allocates labor demand proportionally.
Cost minimization yields a set of demand schedules for labor varieties z












1￿￿w and "w represents
the elasticity of substitution across labor types.














where Qt;t+k is the stochastic discount factor of optimizing consumers who
own ￿rms. It sets contingency plans for P ￿




t+k+1 (j) with probability (1 ￿ ￿p)










Prices are set according to a Calvo mechanism.4 A time t price setter
chooses the price for its good Pt (j) equal to P ￿
t (j), P ￿
t (j) being the price
that maximizes the discounted value of dividends over the expected duration
of the selected price. The ￿rm takes into account that this price will stay
in place the next period with probability ￿p, and that it will be allowed to
reoptimize with probability (1 ￿ ￿p). Firm j is monopolistically competitive
in the market for its good and thus is also constrained by the demand curve
for good j (11).
As is well known, the optimality conditions from this problem imply the










4For a detailed explanation of the Calvo (1983) mechanism see Woodford (2003).




t = pt￿pt￿1 is price in￿ ation, and where
mct is real marginal costs given by
mct = rwt ￿ (yt ￿ nt) (13)
In addition, cost minimization implies that relative factor inputs satisfy the
condition







To a ￿rst-order approximation, production is given by
yt = ￿kt + (1 ￿ ￿)nt (15)
2.3 Unions
The economy has a continuum of unions, each representing a continuum of
workers, a fraction (1 ￿ ￿) are OPT agents, and a fraction ￿ are ROT agents.
Each union sets the wage rate for its members, who stand ready to satisfy
￿rms￿demand for their labor services at the chosen wage. The workers in
a union provide the same type of labor (irrespective of their consumption
behavior) di⁄erentiated from the type of labor services provided by members
of other unions. Firms do not discriminate between consumer types in its
labor demand, and so it follows from the unions￿problems that nr
t = no
t = nt.
These assumptions imply that all the workers earn the same wage and work
the same number of hours.
15Each period, unions choose Wt (z) to maximize the present value of an















subject to the labor demand functions (10) and the budget constraints of its
members (1) and (7), thus taking the e⁄ect of the wage decision on the income
of its members into account. Wage adjustments are assumed to be costly. In
particular, it is assumed that the wage adjustment cost is a quadratic function
of the increase in the wage demanded by the union as modelled in Rotemberg
(1982) for prices. For simplicity, the adjustment cost is proportional to the
aggregate wage bill in the economy (this parallels the speci￿cation of price
adjustment costs in Ireland, 2003). Though the wage bargaining process is
not explicitly modelled, one way of thinking of this cost is that unions have
to negotiate wages each period and that this activity demands economic
resources; the larger the increase in wages obtained, the more e⁄ort unions
would have needed to put into the negotiation process. Each member of the
union covers an equal share of the wage adjustment cost by paying a union
membership fee. Hence the nominal fee paid by a member of union z at time










where the size of the adjustment costs is governed by the parameter ￿w. In
the special case where ￿w = 0, the model e⁄ectively collapses to the model
16in GLV (2007).





















































+ ￿w (mrst ￿ (wt ￿ pt)) (17)
where mrst is the average marginal rate of substitution given by
mrst = ct + ’nt (18)




5Instead of wage adjustment costs, we may assume that a union is allowed to reset
its wage rate each period with a ￿xed probability 1 ￿ ￿w as in Calvo (1983). But to
undo the implications of the implied heterogeneity across unions, a risk-sharing arrange-
ment between unions must be in place. This follows since rule-of-thumb consumers are
barred from sharing risk through ￿nancial markets. Results, however, are very similar. In
particular we would get a Phillips curve with ￿w = (1 ￿ ￿￿w)(1 ￿ ￿w)￿
￿1
w (1 + ’"w)
￿1.
Alternatively, each household must be assumed to provide all types of labor simultaneously
in (as in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006)). However, this formulation is, in our opinion,
in contrast to the assumption of monopolistic competition in the labor market since labor
variety z would be supplied by all agents.
17Unions are essential in the model to avoid di⁄erent wages among type z
agents. If a household was free to choose its wage, it would choose it as a
mark-up over its marginal rate of substitution. And since consumption levels
are di⁄erent between ROT and OPT agents, marginal rates of substitution
and wages would also be di⁄erent. In section 4 we relax the common wage
assumption, introducing two di⁄erent wages for ROT and OPT agents.
2.4 Monetary and ￿scal policy
Monetary policy is set by the central bank according to a simple interest rate
rule that is a special case of the well-known ￿ Taylor rule￿
rt = r + ￿￿￿t (19)
where rt = Rt ￿ 1; r is the steady state value of the nominal interest rate
and ￿￿ measures the reaction of monetary policy to current in￿ ation.
The government has to satisfy the following budget constraint
bt+1 = (1 + ￿)(bt + gt ￿ tt) (20)
where ￿ = 1
￿ ￿ 1.
Taxes are set according to the ￿scal rule
tt = ￿bbt + ￿ggt (21)
18where gt = Gt￿G









Y : ￿b and ￿g are positive constants
re￿ ecting the weights assigned by the ￿scal authority to debt and current
government spending. The condition ￿b >
￿
1+￿; rules out explosive debt
dynamics.
Government spending (normalized by steady state output and expressed
in deviations from steady state) evolves exogenously according to the follow-
ing ￿rst-order autoregressive process
gt = ￿ggt￿1 + ￿t (22)
where 0 < ￿g < 1 measures the persistence of the shocks and ￿t measures
the size of the shock.
2.5 Market clearing and steady state




Nt (z;j)dj for all z
Yt (j) = Y
d
t (j) for all j
Yt = Ct + It + Gt + Ft
whose log-linearized version is
19yt = ￿cct + ￿Iit + gt (23)
where ￿I = I
Y = ￿￿
(￿+￿)￿p. As GLV (2007), we look at a steady state with
zero in￿ ation, zero public debt and a balanced primary de￿cit. To simplify
the solution of the model, it is convenient to impose Co = Cr. Since we are
interested in the dynamic responses to shocks, and not in the characteriza-
tion of the steady state, we see this assumption as a useful simpli￿cation.
However, in steady state ROT and OPT agents di⁄er because the latter
earn dividends and capital income. Therefore, to achieve the same steady
state consumption, OPT agents must be taxed more than ROT agents. For
simplicity, and to facilitate comparability of results, we do not depart from
GLV and we set di⁄erent tax levels in steady state. Moreover, Natvik (2007)
shows that, provided that wages are sticky, equilibrium dynamics are not af-
fected by the assumption on steady state consumption. Equations (3) to (6);
(8), (9), (12) to (15) and (17) to (23) form a system of stochastic di⁄erence
equations that can be solved using standard techniques.
3 Results
As a baseline calibration we choose the same parameter values as GLV (2007).
We made this choice to facilitate the comparability of the results. As GLV
(2007), we set ￿ = 0:025, ￿ = 0:33, ￿ = 1, ￿ = 0:99, ￿ = 0:5, ￿g = 0:2,
￿￿ = 1:5, ￿b = 0:33, ￿g = 0:1, "p = 6, ￿p = 0:75, ￿g = 0:9 and ’ = 0:2.
20We need to ￿x a value for ￿
w (the adjustment costs parameter) and "w (the
elasticity of substitution between labor varieties) that are not present in GLV
where wages are ￿ exible. We set "w equal to 4 (the implied wage mark-up in




w (1+’"w)￿1 = 62:9.
This choice yields the same NKPC for wages as in a Calvo setting ￿ la Erceg,
Henderson and Levin (2000) with four quarters of wage stickiness (￿w = 0:75).
3.1 The e⁄ect of sticky wages
In ￿gure 2 we can see the e⁄ects of sticky wages on some crucial variables.
The dashed line represents the GLV model with ￿ exible wages, the solid line
represents the extension with sticky wages. The size of the shock is a one
percent increase in the government spending to output ratio. In ￿gure 2 we
can observe the ￿rst important result of this paper: even though under sticky
wages the response of the real wage is ￿ at, the consumption response is still
positive.
It is true that, as expected, lower wage in￿ ation (implied by the wage
stickiness) lowers the increase in ROT consumption since current labor in-
come increases less than in the ￿ exible wage case. However, a second e⁄ect
goes in the opposite direction. In fact, lower wage in￿ ation implies a lower
increase in the marginal cost that in turn implies a lower increase in price
in￿ ation. But lower in￿ ation translates into a lower increase in the interest
rate by the central bank, and a lower increase in the interest rate has an ex-
pansionary e⁄ect on OPT consumption and investment. Hence, the response
21of aggregate consumption depends on the strengths of the two e⁄ects. In
our model, the latter (the interest rate e⁄ect) almost o⁄sets the former (the
real wage e⁄ect), and aggregate consumption can still rise after a government
spending shock. Thus, our initial speculation was not correct: the crowding-
in of consumption does not rely on the counterfactual increase in the real
wage, but it is a more robust result that is preserved under a more realistic
speci￿cation of the labor market.
As a corollary, we see that in the model with sticky wages the reaction
of ROT and OPT consumption is less asymmetric. It is still true that ROT
consumers increase their consumption while OPT consumers decrease it, but
the quantitative di⁄erence is now much lower.
The e⁄ect on all the other variables is summarized in ￿gure 3. The ￿rst
three panels show that we are dealing with a government spending shock that
does not maintain a balanced budget. This is crucial in a model with ROT
agents: with OPT agents alone, Ricardian equivalence would hold and there-
fore the presence of a budget de￿cit would be irrelevant. With ROT agents,
the occurrence of a budget de￿cit crucially changes the spending multipliers.
The introduction of sticky wages a⁄ects by construction the in￿ ation rate
and the interest rate response: the lower impact of the shock on the mar-
ginal cost implies a lower increase in in￿ ation through the NKPC, and in the
interest rate through the Taylor rule. The lower increase in the interest rate
favors consumption and investment (whose reaction is now slightly positive)
22and the increase in aggregate demand pushes up output.6 Labor demand
increases, and hours follow this pattern since agents are willing to supply the
quantity of labor demanded by ￿rms.
To sum up, the introduction of sticky wages eliminates the large counter-
factual positive response of the real wage, the in￿ ation rate and the interest
rate whereas it a⁄ects only marginally investment and consumption. Hours
and output behave in the same way, independently of the degree of wage
stickiness. Thus, sticky wages can correct the weaknesses we identi￿ed in the
GLV model while preserving the positive response of consumption.
3.2 Sensitivity analysis
In ￿gure 4 we conduct a sensitivity analysis on the impulse response function
for consumption with respect to some key parameters in the model with sticky
wages.
The parameter ’ deserves special attention: in the traditional business
cycle literature it represents the elasticity of the marginal labor disutility
and it is inversely related to the Frish elasticity of labor supply. Following
Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), GLV (2007) ￿x it at 0.2 to be consistent
6We note that the crowding-out e⁄ect of government spending on investment, described
in all textbooks on intermediate macroeconomics (Mankiw (2000) among others), is not
con￿rmed under our baseline calibration: this result is consistent with the result of Perotti
(2005) who found a positive response of investment, at least for the period 1960-80 in a
sample of OECD countries. In general, in this kind of model the response of investment
is negative (GLV (2007) among others). In our paper we can obtain a positive response
because of the low interest rate response. However, the positive response is not a robust
result as it is for consumption: it depends on the adopted calibration.
23with an elasticity of the real wage with respect to output (for a given level
of consumption and employment) of 0.3. This value, however, is very low
when we interpret ’ in terms of the labor supply elasticity: in the literature
the standard calibration goes from 1 to 3 (as in Gali and Monacelli (2005)).
GLV use a much lower value because for higher values of ’ the model exhibits
indeterminacy. However, as shown by Colciago (2007), under sticky wages
the determinacy region is larger and thus we can lower the labour supply
elasticity towards more realistic values. In ￿gure 4.1, we see that the positive
response of consumption in our model is strongly con￿rmed, even when the
labor supply becomes quite inelastic (’ = 3).
In contrast to GLV (2007), the positive response of consumption is pre-
served under only two quarters of price stickiness, consistent with empirical
evidence provided by Bils and Klenow (2005) (see ￿gure 4.2). This is the
case because wage stickiness can partially substitute for price stickiness by
lowering the marginal cost reaction.
The third parameter we consider is the percentage of rule-of-thumb con-
sumers (￿): we see that 25% is the threshold that reproduces a zero response
in consumption (￿gure 4.3).
Following the RBC literature (King and Watson (1996)), GLV choose the
value of 1 for ￿, the elasticity of the investment to capital ratio with respect
to Tobin￿ s Q. A higher value of ￿ reduces the size of adjustment costs in
investment and allows this variable to ￿ uctuate more. In ￿gure 4.4 we see
that even when this value is raised to 11 the response of consumption is
24almost una⁄ected.
In ￿gure 4.5 we consider the parameter ￿g in the ￿scal rule: when it is
￿xed at zero the increase in government spending is entirely de￿cit-￿nanced,
whereas when it is ￿xed at one the shock is budget-balanced. In the base-









, the response of consumption becomes
signi￿cantly negative. We insist on the fact that this model enables us to
study de￿cit-￿nanced shocks that have very di⁄erent implications with re-
spect to budget-balanced shocks: in a model with only Ricardian consumers
this di⁄erence vanishes.
4 Alternative speci￿cations
In this section we ￿rst change the form of the wage rigidity. Instead of sticky
nominal wages, we introduce real wage rigidity as in Blanchard and Gali
(2007). Then, we model the capital accumulation process as ￿rm-speci￿c, as
in Sveen and Weinke (2005). Finally, we relax the common wage assumption
and we allow for heterogeneity in wages.
4.1 Di⁄erent wage rigidities
In our baseline case we model the nominal wage rigidity using quadratic
adjustment costs ￿ la Rotemberg. In ￿gure 4.6 we show that the positive
response of consumption is independent of the form and the degree of wage
25rigidity. To see this point we consider the rather extreme case of a ￿xed
nominal wage (dashed line): even in this case the positive response of con-
sumption is preserved. An alternative way to model wage rigidity can be
found in Blanchard and Gali (2007). They propose the following (admit-
tedly ad-hoc) wage schedule modeled as a partial adjustment mechanism:
rwt = ￿rwt￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿)(ct + ’nt)
In this framework real wages react only in part to changes in the mar-
ginal rate of substitution and the parameter ￿ is considered as an index
of real wage rigidity. In ￿gure 4.6 we consider the case of partial real wage
rigidity (￿ = 0:75; dotted line). The response of consumption is still positive
and hence our result is independent of the postulated wage rigidity (either
nominal or real).7
4.2 Firm-speci￿c capital
The "rental rate assumption" used in GLV (2007) is not a satisfactory way
of modelling the capital accumulation process: it is more realistic to assume
that the investment decision is made at the ￿rm level. As shown by Danthine
and Donaldson (2002), the rental rate assumption is innocuous in the RBC
7Although in this model nominal wage rigidity and real wage rigidity share the same
properties, it is not always the case. Blanchard and Gali (2007) study the optimal mon-
etary policy problem: under real wage rigidity it is not possible to stabilize the output
gap and in￿ ation at the same time, whereas it is the case under nominal wage rigidity (if
in￿ ation is considered as a weighted average of price in￿ ation and wage in￿ ation).
26framework because the "rental rate" model and the "￿rm-speci￿c" model are
isomorphic. However, with sticky prices the two models are isomorphic only
if the market for capital goods reopens after any shock, and ￿rms with high
demand (the ones whose price is ￿xed) can acquire the additional capital
they need from ￿rms who face low demand (the ones that changed their
price recently). Danthine and Donaldson (2002) argue that ￿ it is feasible for
price constrained ￿rms, at the last minute, to unbolt machines and ship them
to the market while it is too costly for them to print new price lists!￿ . On
the basis of this argument, the recent literature that introduces ￿rm-speci￿c
capital in the New Keynesian framework seems very promising. Under the
￿rm-speci￿c assumption, capital becomes productive only after one period,
and the marginal cost becomes ￿rm-speci￿c, depending on the history of
price adjustments. Firms with high demand cannot rent more capital in the
market and thus must increase the labor input. In that way ￿rms with high
demand face a higher marginal cost and a lower capital/labor ratio. It turns
out that the marginal cost depends not only on economy-wide factors (as
in the rental rate case) but also on the output of the ￿rm. A government
spending shock raises the economy-wide component of the marginal cost,
and thus a ￿rm that is allowed to reoptimize its price will plan to raise it.
However, the rise in price would reduce output, which in turn would lower the
marginal cost, and this second e⁄ect happens only if capital is ￿rm-speci￿c.
Therefore, the ￿rm will increase its price by less than what it would have
done if capital were not predetermined.
27In a series of very in￿ uential papers, Sveen and Weinke (2005 and 2007)
show that from a technical point of view the introduction of ￿rm-speci￿c
capital in the New Keynesian model a⁄ects only the NKPC. (12) now looks
like:




p < ￿rental rate
p =
(1￿￿￿p)(1￿￿p)
￿p . Thus the NKPC looks
￿ atter. The coe¢ cient ￿firm specific
p is a complicated function of structural
parameters and has to be computed numerically: ￿firm specific
p (￿;￿;"p;￿;￿;￿).
We use the procedure proposed by Woodford (2005) and implemented by
Christiano (2005).
In ￿gure 5 we can evaluate the impact of ￿rm-speci￿c capital on the con-
sumption response: the solid line represents the model with sticky wages and
￿rm-speci￿c capital and the dashed line is the baseline calibration of GLV
with ￿ exible wages and rental capital. We see that ￿rm-speci￿c capital re-
inforces the mechanism described in section 3 for sticky wages: both sticky
wages and ￿rm-speci￿c capital reduce the marginal cost reaction to a govern-
ment spending shock, and this real rigidity translates into lower in￿ ation and
a lower reaction by the monetary policy authority. The lower increase in the
interest rate pushes OPT consumption and investment further up, inducing
the same increase in consumption as in GLV (2007). The main message from
￿gure 5 is that the GLV result on consumption is reinforced under a more
28realistic modeling of the capital accumulation process. Notice that under our
baseline calibration ￿firm specific
p is 0.0216. This value is rather low but not
far from the estimated values in Gali, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2001) and
Eichanbaum and Fisher (2005) ranging between 0.03 and 0.05. ￿rental rate
p
would be 0.085.
Sveen and Weinke (2005) exploit the expansionary properties of ￿rm-
speci￿c capital to lower the degree of price stickiness in the model. We can
do the same for government spending shocks. In ￿gure 5.2 we see that under
two quarters of price stickiness the GLV model exhibits a negative response
of consumption whereas in the model with ￿rm-speci￿c capital and sticky
wages the consumption response is still largely positive. Under two quarters
of price stickiness ￿firm specific
p is 0.12 whereas ￿rental rate
p would be 0.5. Firm-
speci￿c capital can thus reconcile the positive response of consumption, the
empirical evidence on price rigidity (Bils and Klenow (2005) and Nakamura
and Steinsson (2007)) and, to some extent, the empirical evidence on the
slope of the NKPC (Gali, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2001).
Woodford (2005) argues that, once ￿rm-speci￿c capital is introduced, it
is more appropriate to infer a value for the elasticity of the investment to
capital ratio with respect to Tobin￿ s Q from ￿rm-speci￿c data. Gilchrist and
Himmelberg (1995) estimate this elasticity using ￿rm level data from the
manufacturing sector over the period 1985-1989: they ￿nd a value equal to
12.1, very close to the value suggested by Woodford (2005), that is, 13.3.
However, this value is very high compared with the estimates based on ag-
29gregate data (Christiano and Fisher (1998)). In ￿gure 5.3 we see that, even
using a value of 12.1, the response of consumption is almost una⁄ected. In
￿gure 5.4 we see that the positive response of consumption is preserved even
when labor supply is extremely inelastic.
4.3 Heterogeneity in wages
In the baseline version of our model we keep the assumption of a common
wage between ROT and OPT agents to facilitate the comparison with GLV
(2007). A legitimate question is to test whether the results are a⁄ected
by the common wage assumption. In this section we allow both kinds of
agents to choose their own wage, while being ready to supply the quantity
of labor demanded by ￿rms. The form of the wage rigidity (￿ la Rotemberg)
implies that all ROT agents choose the same wage. Nevertheless, this wage is
di⁄erent from the one chosen by OPT agents, who have a di⁄erent marginal
rate of substitution. A similar modeling choice can be found in Bilbiee and
Straub (2004), where wages are ￿ exible instead of sticky and there is perfect
competition in the labor market. The GEM model developed at the IMF
incorporates ROT consumers and a similar speci￿cation of the labor market
(Faruquee et al. (2006)). This modeling choice implies a forward-looking





















A detailed derivation of these two equations can be found in the appendix.
In ￿gure 6 we plot the responses to a government spending shock under
the baseline calibration. The dashed line indicates the model with ￿ exible
wages and rental rate capital. We now identify a di⁄erent response in OPT
wages and in ROT wages. OPT wages decline slightly because of the wealth
e⁄ect that lowers the marginal rate of substitution of OPT agents (MRSo).
MRSr does not decline since the wealth e⁄ect does not hit ROT agents. The
ROT wage increases, whereas the OPT wage declines, essentially because
of the wealth e⁄ect and the di⁄erent marginal rates of substitutions. At
the same time ￿rms have the incentive to hire more OPT labor since the
costs are lower. OPT hours increase considerably and ROT hours increase
only slightly. Moreover, the delayed response of taxes explains the hump-
shaped response of ROT hours. Current income of ROT agents increases
only slightly and the response of ROT consumption is low. The e⁄ect on
aggregate consumption is almost negative.
This result is very important because it shows that the positive response
of consumption is lost once we depart from the common wage assumption.
However, the positive response of consumption is rescued when sticky wages
are introduced (the dashed line): under four quarters of wage stickiness, the
two wages react in similar ways and the same for hours worked. Under sticky
31wages the impact of wage heterogeneity in the model is strongly reduced and
the dynamics are similar to the model with a common wage. Thus, our
initial speculation on the impact of sticky wages is completely reversed. In
section 3 we showed that sticky wages can coexist with a positive response
of consumption under the common wage assumption. Here, we have just
shown that sticky wages are even essential to obtain the positive response
of consumption when wages are di⁄erent. The most important result of this
paper is thus that sticky wages con￿rm and generalize the validity of the
GLV result. Two other recent papers ￿nd that sticky wages are useful in this
framework. Colciago (2007) shows that the determinacy region is larger in a
model with sticky wages. Natvik (2007), instead, investigate the impact of
the assumption that all agents share the same consumption in steady state.
He ￿nds that, provided that wages are sticky, this assumption is innocuous.
We believe that our results are complemented nicely by these related papers.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we study the responses of macroeconomic variables to a gov-
ernment spending shock in a model where Ricardian equivalence does not
hold. We build on GLV (2007) and we show that it is possible to obtain a
positive response of consumption, as observed in US data, avoiding a coun-
terfactual increase in the real wage, the in￿ ation rate and the interest rate.
The key ingredient to eliminate the counterfactual dynamics in GLV (2007)
32is the introduction of sticky wages into the model. Even though the wage
rigidity limits the increase in current income of ROT consumers, aggregate
consumption can still rise because a lower increase in the interest rate favors
OPT consumption and investment.
The sticky wage assumption, even if intuitively it was not the case, allows
us to generalize the GLV result on several dimensions. In contrast to GLV
(2007), our model can reproduce the positive consumption response under a
low labor supply elasticity, a low degree of price stickiness, di⁄erent form of
wage rigidity and a more realistic capital accumulation process.
Moreover, once we relax the common wage assumption, sticky wages are
even essential to reproduce the positive response of consumption. Since a
substantial evidence supports the sticky wage assumption, we can conclude
that the GLV result is strongly con￿rmed by our analysis and ROT consumers
are an important ingredient to explain the impact of ￿scal shocks.
This conclusion is reinforced in two companion papers. In Furlanetto
and Seneca (2007b) we show that real rigidities can dramatically reduce
the percentage of ROT consumers in the model. We can obtain the same
consumption multiplier as in GLV (2007) having only 25% of constrained
agents, instead of 50%, and two quarters of price stickiness, instead of four. In
Furlanetto and Seneca (2007a) we show that ROT consumers are extremely
useful also in explaining productivity shocks. Together with nominal and
real rigidities, they make it easier to obtain the negative response of hours
after a productivity shock as in Gali (1999). A large literature has shown the
33importance of nominal and real rigidity to explain business cycle dynamics.
We show that ￿nancial frictions can also be useful.
This work can be extended in several directions. In the model, monetary
policy is represented by a simple Taylor rule. An interesting question is to
study how the presence of rule-of-thumb consumers in￿ uences the optimal
monetary policy. A second extension concerns the open economy. Prelim-
inary results from an open economy version of this model tell us that the
model is able to reproduce a consumption multiplier that is declining in the
degree of openness. This is a feature that is present in the data and that
models with only optimizing consumers cannot deliver. A third project is to
introduce complementarities in the utility function and productive govern-
ment spending. A model with several features inducing a positive response
of consumption could be meaningfully estimated using Bayesian methods to
understand which feature is more relevant to explain the response of con-
sumption.
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Appendix
In this appendix we extend the baseline model letting each household
choose its wage under adjustments costs ￿ la Rotemberg. Each household
supplies one variety of labor indexed by z and is a monopolistic competitor
on this market.




















where "w denotes the elasticity of substitution between the two labor














































t (j) denotes the quantity of OPT labor used by the ￿rm in the produc-
tion process, No
t (j;z) is the quantity of OPT labor of variety z and "wo is
the elasticity of substitution between di⁄erent varieties of OPT labor. The
same notation is used for ROT agents.
The wage indexes corresponding to the labor bundles (25) and (26) are





























Each ￿rm takes the wages W r
t (z) and W o
t (z) as given and chooses the
40optimal demand for each labor variety by minimizing costs subject to the
aggregation constraints (25) and (26). The demand functions for each variety





























Next, taking the wage indexes W r
t and W o
t as given, each ￿rm chooses the
optimal demand for the two labor bundles Nr
t (j) and No
t (j) by minimizing



















(1 ￿ ￿)Nt (j)






























































The ￿rst-order condition with respect to W o

















































t denotes OPT wage in￿ ation.













subject to the budget constraint and labor demand (derived aggregating (27)
across ￿rms):
8Even if in equilibrium aggregate hours and wages (Nt;Wt) and individual variety hours
and wages (Nt (z);Wt (z)) are equal, ex-ante it is not the case. Therefore, when we write
the maximization problem we index hours and wages to variety z. For sake of simplicity,


























The static FOC with respect to W r
























The log-linearized model. The extended model is log-linearized around
the same steady state as the baseline model: hence, in steady state all agents
share the same wages, hours worked and consumption levels. Tax rates are
set accordingly. The wage setting equations are given by log-linearized ver-
























￿wo and ￿wr =
"wr
￿ ￿1
￿wr . For simplicity we impose "w =
"wr = "wo = 4. We calibrate ￿wo and ￿wr to be consistent with 4 quarters









w (1+’"w)￿1 and ￿w = 0:75.
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